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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Sustainable water management has been on the global agenda for more than 
thirty years. The United Nations Conference for Water was held in 1977 as 
the initial effort on an international level. However, water issues faded from 
the agenda until the 1990s, at which time they gained a new impetus. 
Through the International Conference on Water and the Environment, 
which proved to be a major initiative for action through the Dublin Prin-
ciples (ICWE 1992). The Dublin Principles outlined the challenging need to 
integrate the following dimensions of sustainable water management: 
 
 ecological: respecting water as a vital, limited and vulnerable resour-
ce needed for survival and development; 
 social and institutional: enabling access to water, ensuring equity 
among the stakeholders of all sectors and taking into account the con-
cerns, perspectives and interests of all stakeholders through partici-
pation; and 
 economic: considering water as an economic good that is demanded 
by competing sectors and requires cost-effective processes for finding, 
development, storage and distribution of water as well as the opera-
tion and maintenance of infrastructures. 
 
As reflected in all these dimensions, the limited water resources should be 
divided among the competing domestic, industrial and agricultural sectors. 
In many countries, the agricultural sector has the highest share of total water 
use due to crop irrigation. Therefore, the impact of water use in irrigation is 
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significant for sustainable water management. On the one hand, enough 
irrigation water must be supplied in order to produce food. On the other, 
demand for irrigation water should reflect a concern for sustainable water 
use, since nothing should threater the availability of water resources to other 
sectors or the sustainability of soil resources.  
Irrigation systems, that is the physical and institutional elements that 
enable the withdrawal of water from the source, and movement of the water 
to the root zone of land (Small and Svendsen 1990), enable the use of water 
for irrigation. Collective action is needed for sustainable management of 
these systems, since they constitute examples of common-pool resources 
(CPRs) due to the following characteristics (Ostrom 1990):  
 
 Excluding the potential water users from the irrigation system might 
be costly, not only in economic or social terms, but also due to 
technical or institutional constraints.  
 Since irrigation water is subtractable, i.e., the units withdrawn by a 
user cannot be used by others, over-extraction of water resources by a 
group of users might cause availability problems for other users. 
 The public infrastructure, i.e., the physical components that support 
the provision of irrigation water to the users, should be maintained in 
order to ensure continuous water supply. 
 
In recent decades, it has been widely accepted that public participation, that 
is, the involvement of individual and/or organised public members in the 
decision-making processes, brings about an opportunity to improve environ-
mental management by incorporating the knowledge, values and perspec-
tives of the public (Eden 1996; Dietz 2003; Pound et al. 2003). The situation 
is no different for water management, as demonstrated by the policy docu-
ments and scholarly literature. Participation of stakeholders was among the 
Dublin Principles almost two decades ago (ICWE 1992). The Water Frame-
work Directive, enacted as the major water policy document of the European 
Union, set ambitious goals for participation (CEC 2000). In the recent 
scholarly literature, public participation is mentioned as a building block of 
water management (Kallis and Nijkamp 2000; Jaspers 2003; Mostert 2003; 
Delli Priscoli 2004; Creighton 2005; Sijbesmaa and Postmab 2008). 
Since farmers are the users of water in the agricultural sector, they can 
play a key role in achieving sustainable water management. The actions of 
both individual farmers and their organisations are of particular importance 
due to the relationships that they bring about (Small and Svendsen 1990). 
Institutions constitute a key variable with regard to actions, since they have 
multiple functions such as shaping the permitted, prohibited and allowed 
actions, reducing uncertainty by providing structure to human interactions 
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and creating a common meaning for actions and outcomes (North 1990; 
Ostrom 1998). Through participation, farmers and their organisations can 
establish institutions, that is the formal and informal rules of action, for 
sustainable water management. 
With regard to farmers’ participation in the management of irrigation 
systems, the concept of participatory irrigation management (PIM) has be-
come relevant in the last two decades (World Bank 2007). PIM enables the 
participation of individual farmers and their water user organisations 
(WUOs) in the decisions related to irrigation management. PIM is 
implemented in many countries where irrigated agriculture is practised. The 
major motivation to implement PIM has not always involved the farmers in 
management decisions, but has decreased the burden of operation and main-
tenance costs on public water agencies. Accordingly, the widespread imple-
mentation of PIM, especially in developing countries, has been a part of 
development assistance or privatisation programmes that aimed at transfer-
ring the irrigation systems from public agencies to WUOs or private organi-
sations (Svendsen and Meinzen-Dick 1997). Nevertheless, there is ample 
evidence from many countries that PIM contributes to sustainable irrigation 
management and to the capacity building of individual farmers and their 
WUOs (Groenfeldt and Svendsen 2000; FAO 2004). 
Development of ‘frameworks that can facilitate the direct involvement of 
appropriators in governing common-pool resources’ is suggested as a means 
of achieving collective action in CPR management (Ostrom et al. 1994, p. 
242). Such frameworks essentially require users’ participation in the 
decision-making processes of collective action, and the following benefits 
are expected from participation (Ostrom et al. 1994; Johnson 1997; Marshall 
1999; Ostrom 1999): 
 
 Providing opportunities for learning individually and collectively: 
Users can learn from the experiences of other users and ascertain the 
impacts of individual actions (both by themselves and by other users) 
on resource sustainability. They can also comprehend the costs and 
benefits of breaking and following the rules. 
 Building a sense of ownership: Participation demonstrates to the 
users that each of them has a stake in the state of the resource that 
they use and that their knowledge and perspectives are important for 
the sustainability of the resource. Thus, it becomes more probable 
that the users adopt the rules and adapt them to local circumstances. 
 Improving compliance: Through participation, users can keep track 
of their own actions as well as the actions of other users and make 
sure that collective commitments are kept by everyone. Participation 
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also enhances the perception of the users that the sanctions are 
imposed on those who violate the rules. 
 
These benefits can reinforce each other as participation processes occur in 
time. When users participate in the decision-making processes, they have 
more opportunity to understand and adopt the rules by learning from each 
other, to provide their local knowledge for devising equitable and efficient 
rules and to follow those rules effectively (Baland and Platteau 1996). 
Hence, it can be suggested that participation of users fosters collective action 
in CPR management and that building participatory institutions contributes 
to collective action.  
Given the connection of public participation and collective action to 
sustainable water management, it can be worthwhile to evaluate the institu-
tions of public participation related to those of collective action. According-
ly, answering the questions below can contribute to the evaluation of public 
participation from the standpoint of institutions: 
 
 What are the institutions of the decision-making processes of CPR 
management? 
 Which institutions of collective action shape the participatory mecha-
nisms? 
 How can the institutions of participatory mechanisms be systemati-
cally extracted from the institutions of collective action? 
 
In order to answer these questions, one needs to explore the institutional 
characteristics of participatory mechanisms that can contribute to the estab-
lishment of institutions of collective action. In the scholarly literature, there 
are various approaches to evaluate public participation activities – see Ash-
ford and Rest (1999), Chess (2000), Rowe and Frewer (2004) and Özerol 
and Newig (2008) for reviews of approaches to evaluate public participation. 
However, to our knowledge, no institutional approaches have been deve-
loped with the goal of evaluating the degree that participation fosters col-
lective action in CPR management. Therefore, our motivation in this chapter 
is to develop such an approach and to introduce a set of principles to eva-
luate the institutions of public participation, particularly for the case of 
irrigation water management. 
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II.  BASIC CONCEPTS: COLLECTIVE ACTION, 
COMMON-POOL RESOURCES, INSTITUTIONS AND 
SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS  
 
Collective action is defined as ‘the activities that require the coordination of 
efforts by two or more individuals’ (Sandler 1992, p. xvii). CPRs such as 
forests, fisheries and irrigation systems, are characterised by the need of 
users to engage in collective action (Ostrom et al. 1994). An elaborate study 
of collective action for sustainable management of CPRs should address all 
related variables that are identified as follows (Ostrom 1999):  
 
 attributes of the resource and the community; 
 institutions about management; and 
 interactions among the variables. 
 
As explained for the irrigation systems above, CPRs have three basic attribu-
tes that call for collective action. However, collective action problems may 
arise due to these attributes. Subtractability of the resource and difficulty of 
exclusion may cause the users to have incentives to extract the resource 
excessively and to free-ride with regard to the maintenance of the infra-
structure. As a result, the system may become prone to deterioration and 
even extinction. The major attributes of the community are the values of 
behaviour, the level of common understanding about how the system works 
and the extent of homogeneity in the preferences (ibid.). Additionally, the 
users’ awareness of and capacity to engage in collective action can be 
considered crucial for the sustainability of the CPR. Constituting the final 
set of variables, institutions are the formal and informal rules inherent in the 
system (North 1990; Ostrom 1990). 
Anderies et al. (2004, p. 18) define a socio-ecological system as ‘a subset 
of social systems in which some of the interdependent relationships among 
humans are mediated through interactions with biophysical and non-human 
biological units’. Given the interdependency of and the interactions among 
the resource and the users, an appropriate approach could be to discuss 
CPRs on the scale of a socio-ecological system and to explore the achiev-
ability of collective action within a single system. Such a system would 
comprise CPR, resource users and other elements that enable the users and 
CPR to interact with each other. 
The institutional approach to collective action asserts that a collective 
action situation is the sum of institutions that shape the actions of actors and 
the interactions among the actors. Rules defined at different scales affect the 
structure of collective action situations and in turn the way that individuals 
act and the outcomes of the socio-ecological system (Ostrom 1998). It is 
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inevitable that the outcomes at different scales interact with the rules at the 
same or at different spatial and temporal scales. If the design of the rules at 
each scale is not aligned with the dynamics of social and ecological ele-
ments, then problems can be experienced at the system level. The match 
between the institutions and the key physical attributes of socio-ecological 
systems is referred to as ‘institutional fit’ (Ostrom 1990).  
The rules that interact at different scales are called ‘nested rules’, that is, 
one set of rules defines how other sets of rules can be revised and changed 
(Ostrom 1998). An approach to categorise the nested rules of collective 
action is to put them into three hierarchical levels: operational, collective 
choice and constitutional choice (Kiser and Ostrom 1982). At the lowest 
level, the operational rules affect the operational situations, for example, 
provision, extraction, monitoring and enforcement. The rules at the upper 
level are the collective-choice rules, which define how the operational rules 
are made and by whom the operational rules can be defined and changed. 
Finally, the rules at the constitutional-choice level indirectly affect the 
operational level actions since they define how the collective-choice rules are 
changed. The number of hierarchical levels can be increased for defining the 
meta-constitutional situations (Ostrom 1999). 
 
 
III. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF COMMON-POOL 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
 
The basic elements of the CPR as a socio-ecological system mentioned 
before are the resource, resource users and public infrastructure. Anderies et 
al. (2004) identify public infrastructure providers and external environment 
as two additional elements. Public infrastructure providers, for example, 
officers from public agencies, are responsible for the appropriation and 
provision of the resource to the users and they constitute a crucial element 
for studying public participation. External environment includes the sources 
of disturbance to the resource and infrastructure (e.g., weather and geolo-
gical events) and to the users and providers (e.g., economy and political 
system). We acknowledge that external environment has a crucial impact on 
the functioning of socio-ecological systems. Nevertheless, for the purpose of 
keeping the focus on interactions between the resource and humans, that is 
the users and providers, we exclude the external environment from conside-
ration. Actions enable the interaction of users and providers with other ele-
ments within the underlying formal and informal rules. Therefore, we consi-
der them as the fifth element of the framework. In order to reach a compact 
set of actions, we utilise Ostrom’s (1990) design principles of institutions for 
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sustainable management of CPRs. These principles and the basic action(s) 
that can be inferred from each principle are summarised in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1 Design principles for institutions and related actions 
 
Design principle Related action(s) 
The individuals or households who have right to use 
resource are clearly defined 
Users use the resource 
There is a proportion between the amount of resource 
used and the effort devoted to infrastructure 
maintenance 
Users use the resource 
Users maintain the infrastructure 
Monitors are the users themselves or they are 
accountable to the users 
Monitors monitor resource use 
Monitors monitor infrastructure 
maintenance 
Users organise to assign monitors 
Users organise to sanction violation 
Users who violate the rules are sanctioned by the 
monitors and/or the users 
The users who are affected by the rules about resource 
use can modify those rules 
Users/providers regulate resource use 
Users/providers regulate infra-structure 
maintenance 
Users organise to change existing rules 
Users organise to devise new rules 
 
There are low-cost, local arenas for conflict resolution 
among users or between users and providers 
Users have the rights to devise their own institutions 
Activities for the above principles are organised in 
multiple layers of nested enterprises 
 
Source: Developed by the author on the basis of Ostrom (1990). 
 
Based on Table 7.1, the actions of users and providers can be categorised 
into five main groups: 
 
 Users use the CPR. 
 Users maintain the public infrastructure. 
 Providers – or organised users – monitor and regulate the use of CPR. 
 Providers – or organised users – monitor and regulate the mainten-
ance of public infrastructure. 
 Users organise to become providers and take action. 
 
Having identified and described all the elements and their interactions, the 
resulting framework is illustrated as shown in Figure 7.1. 
 
 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK TO THE CASE 
OF IRRIGATION SYSTEMS 
 
Participatory institutions indicate users’ involvement in the rule-making 
processes. Therefore, ‘participatory rule-making’ can be used as an umbrella 
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Notes 
Directed arrows from users imply the actions that users take directly, i.e., ‘use’ and ‘monitor’, and 
the actions that they take indirectly through participation, i.e., ‘regulate’and ‘monitor’. If users take 
the action of ‘organise to become’, then they act like providers through participatory mechanisms. 
Hence the actions of providers, i.e., ‘regulate’ and ‘monitor’, can be partly or entirely taken over by 
the users themselves. 
 
Figure 7.1  A conceptual framework for CPR management 
 
term to imply user participation in the decision-making processes regarding 
the definition, enforcement and revision of the rules. The degree of partici-
patory rule-making can be assessed by investigating the existence of actions 
that the users take in the rule-making processes. As explained in the above 
framework, use, maintain, regulate, monitor and organise are the five basic 
actions, and all the rules related to these actions are institutions of collective 
action. When the users take action in CPR management, they participate in 
the rule-making processes, too. Hence, participatory rule-making occurs 
within the institutions of collective action and the institutions of public 
participation can be inferred from within the institutions of collective action.  
In the following subsections, we elaborate on the institutions of participa-
tion by applying the framework to irrigation systems, which constitute an 
example of CPRs, and categorise the institutions of participation as nested 
rules by adapting the above-mentioned three-level hierarchy. The empirical 
data are gathered through the secondary analysis of findings from a field 
study (Özerol 2007). Before the discussion of institutions, we briefly present 
the context, scope and methodology of the field study. 
 
Description of the Field Study 
 
The field study aimed at collecting and analysing empirical data as part of 
the evaluation of public participation during the development of indicators 
for sustainable water use in irrigation. It was carried out in 2005 in Harran 
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Plain, a region located in south-eastern Turkey. In the last two decades, 
irrigation development investments have been made within the scope of a 
regional development programme (GAP – South-Eastern Anatolia Project), 
so irrigated agriculture has been practiced since 1995. With regard to the 
impacts of irrigation on the sustainability of water and soil resources, prob-
lems were reported about water-use efficiency, drainage and soil salinity 
(Kendirli et al. 2005; Yazar et al. 2002). 
The State Hydraulics Works (DSI) and WUOs are the two key stakehol-
ders of irrigation management in the region. DSI is the public organisation 
responsible for the planning, development and administration of water 
resources at national level. It has a general directorate and 26 regional 
directorates. Two officers of the regional directorate responsible for Harran 
Plain were interviewed. WUOs are the legal entities comprising the local 
authorities and representatives of farmers after the transfer of irrigation 
management from the DSI. They are responsible for the distribution of water 
to farmers, as well as the operation, maintenance and repair of the irrigation 
infrastructure. Five out of the 11 WUOs in the region were contacted. In 
addition to the interviews with two organisations, conversations were made 
with farmers. 
Qualitative data collected through the interviews and the review of related 
documents were used for an institutional analysis of irrigation water use. 
The context was examined in terms of the attributes of the resource, provi-
ders and users, as well as the social and cultural conditions of the region. 
The rules at constitutional-choice, collective-choice and operational levels, 
the outcomes at the system level and the actions of the stakeholders were 
investigated and discussed. 
 
Institutions of Participation 
 
We use the findings from the secondary analysis of the field study to discuss 
the interactions of actors with other elements and to formulate a set of 
questions related to the rules at each level. We also identify possible answers 
for each question, since there can be one or more answers depending on the 
local context. In order to provide questions with a standard structure, we 
investigate the seven types of working rules, that is, entry and exit, position, 
scope, authority, aggregation, information and payoff rules (Ostrom 1998) 
and utilise the ADICO format, which consists of the following components 
(Crawford and Ostrom 1995): 
 
 Attributes: the properties of the group to which the rule applies. 
 Deontic: the operator from deontic logic that specifies whether the 
rule permits, obliges or prohibits a certain action or outcome. 
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 Aim: the action or outcome that the rules refer to. 
 Conditions: the set of variables that specify when, where and how the 
rule applies. 
 Or else: the sanction assigned to detected noncompliance with the 
rule. 
 
Zero-order institutions  
There are institutions about resource use and infrastructure maintenance, 
whether or not the users participate in decision-making processes. These 
rules form the basis for the ‘use’ and ‘maintain’ actions linking users to 
resource and infrastructure, respectively. In other words, the users cannot 
engage in collective action without the establishment of these rules. Such 
rules can be called the ‘zero-order institutions of participation’. The 
questions to reveal the zero-order institutions and their possible answers are 
presented in Table 7.2. 
Zero-order institutions can have a direct impact on the sustainability of 
the CPR and the infrastructure, since they are the underlying institutions 
that shape how the resource is used and how the infrastructure is main-
tained. If there is a problem with the definition and enforcement of these 
rules, it is likely that there is a collective action problem, too. So, the zero-
order institutions should be tailored according to the attributes of the 
resource and the infrastructure. For instance, if the resource is highly sub-
tractive, attention must be paid to the efficiency, fairness and enforceability 
of the rules (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994). 
 
First-order institutions  
The actions ‘use’ and ‘maintain’ are not directly related to the decision-
making processes of irrigation management but rather to the inputs, outputs 
and boundaries of the processes of water use and infrastructure maintenance. 
Participation of users in the decision-making processes can be assessed by 
investigating whether or not the actions assigned to providers, that is, 
‘regulate’ and ‘monitor’, are taken by the users, too. When the users partici-
pate in the definition and enforcement of the zero-order institutions, they 
have the opportunity to make rules during two basic processes, namely regu-
lation of resource use and infrastructure maintenance and monitoring of 
resource use and infrastructure maintenance. Accordingly, the rules related 
to regulation and monitoring shape the way that rules about use and main-
tenance are defined, enforced and monitored. This higher level of rules also 
includes those about the participation of users in the processes for the defi-
nition, enforcement and monitoring of the rules about resource use and 
infrastructure maintenance. We call such rules the ‘first-order institutions of 
participation’. 
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Table 7.2  Questions for studying the zero-order institutions of 
participation  
 
Use of irrigation water Maintenance of irrigation 
infrastructure 
Questions Possible answers Questions Possible answers 
What are the require-
ments to have per-
mission to use water? 
 Field near the main 
irrigation canal 
 Membership to WUO 
 Payment of fees 
Who is obliged to 
do the maintenance 
works? 
 All users 
 Users without 
managing duties 
 Hired workers 
When are the users 
permitted to use 
water? 
 During the irrigation 
seasons 
 According to a distri-
bution schedule 
When must the 
maintenance works 
be done? 
 Before/after irri-
gation seasons 
 Whenever there is a 
leakage or damage 
What are the irriga-
tion methods that the 
users are permitted 
(or obliged) to use? 
 Drip irrigation 
 Furrow irrigation 
 Spray irrigation 
 
In what ways are 
the users permitted 
(or obliged) to con-
tribute to mainte-
nance? 
 Labour 
 Supplying 
equipment 
 Payment of costs 
What is the basis to 
determine the irriga-
tion fee that each user 
is obliged to pay? 
 Size of land 
 Type of crop cultivated 
 Irrigation method 
What is the basis to 
determine the main-
tenance costs that 
each user is obliged 
to pay? 
 Size of land 
 Type of crop 
cultivated 
 Irrigation method 
Which actions are 
prohibited?  
 Using excess water 
 Not complying with the 
distribution schedule 
 Not paying the 
irrigation fee 
Which actions are 
prohibited? 
 Not joining the 
maintenance works 
 Damaging the 
infrastructure  
What sanctions are 
imposed on the users 
that take prohibited 
actions? 
 Monetary fine 
 Prohibition to use 
water for a certain time 
 Extra contribution to 
maintenance 
What sanctions are 
imposed on the 
users that take 
prohibited actions? 
 Monetary fine 
 Prohibition to use 
water for a certain 
time 
 
Answering the two questions for each zero-order institution reveals the first-
order institutions of participation. First, ‘by whom’ questions identify the 
actors that are permitted or obliged to regulate and monitor resource use and 
infrastructure maintenance. Second, the (non)participatory mechanisms, 
which are used for the rule-making processes, are found out by answering 
‘how’ questions. Based on the questions of zero-order institutions, the ques-
tions and possible answers for the first-order institutions are identified as 
listed in Table 7.3. 
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Table 7.3  Questions for studying the first-order institutions of 
participation 
 
 Use of irrigation water Maintenance of irrigation 
infrastructure  
By whom and how . . . By whom and how . . . Possible answers 
Are the permissions to use water 
given? 
Are the people that do the 
maintenance works assigned? 
By whom? 
 WUO board (with 
members from local 
authorities) 
 WUO manager  
 WUO officer(s) 
 WUO member users 
 Elected users 
How? 
 Board meeting 
 Decision of 
manager/officer 
 Group meeting 
(representative users) 
 Voting 
 Consensus 
Are the periods to use water set? Is the timing of maintenance set? 
Are the permitted (or obliged) 
irrigation methods identified? 
Are the ways to contribute to 
maintenance identified? 
Is the basis to determine the 
amount of water that each user is 
permitted to use selected? 
Is the basis to determine the 
maintenance efforts that each user 
is obliged to devote selected? 
Is the basis to determine the 
irrigation fee that each user is 
obliged to pay selected? 
Is the basis to determine the 
maintenance costs that each user is 
obliged to pay selected? 
Are the prohibited actions defined? 
Are the sanctions for prohibited actions defined? 
Is the compliance to rules monitored? By whom? 
 WUO officer(s) 
 WUO member users 
 Elected users 
 External monitors 
How? 
 On-site inspection 
 Data collection and 
analysis 
 
Participation of users in regulation and monitoring implies that users are 
involved in actions that are assigned to the providers in the framework. 
First-order institutions lay out the scope of participatory mechanisms that 
enable such actions, and the answers to ‘by whom’ and ‘how’ questions 
reveal the extent to which users participate in the rule-making processes. In 
this respect, two significant attributes of the system are the size and homo-
geneity of the user group. When the number of users is high, it can become 
difficult and time-consuming to agree on rule definition and to enforce the 
rules (Baland and Platteau 1996; Ostrom et al. 1999). As the size of the 
group increases, involving representative users in the rule-making processes 
might be preferred. However, selecting the adequate number of representa-
tives might not be straightforward and it can bring about the issues of fair-
ness and equity, particularly for heterogeneous groups. If there are ambigui-
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ties about the definitions of rules or if the rules are not effectively enforced, 
the ‘regulate’ and ‘monitor’ actions can result in problems with resource use 
and infrastructure maintenance.  
 
Second-order institutions  
Although necessary, the observation of extensive participation is not suffi-
cient to conclude that participation is effective in contributing to sustainable 
CPR management. For instance, the self-interest of the participants about 
the rule-making processes can be a barrier before effective participation. 
Some participants might manipulate the participation situations to fulfil 
their self-interests, which can even contradict collective interests and threa-
ten resource sustainability. Definition of sanctions is an example of such 
situations. Participation can lead to a decision to sanction excessive water 
use only with monetary fines, which can decrease the financial burden 
caused by irrigation fees. However, continuing excessive water use can cause 
long-term problems on soil quality, decrease the water available to other 
users, and create conflicts between upstream and downstream users.  
The considerations mentioned above can be incorporated into the analysis 
by investigating the institutions at a higher level. Since these institutions 
will be about the institutions of participation, they can be called ‘second-
order institutions of participation’. Second-order institutions shape the 
action ‘organise’ in the framework and have outcomes in terms of revision 
of the existing rules and definition of new rules. The evaluation of second-
order institutions facilitates answering the question: ‘How are the users 
organised to change the rules towards sustainable CPR management?’. 
Other questions that can be asked in order to reveal the second-order 
institutions of participation are presented in Table 7.4. For a comprehensive 
assessment, the questions should be answered for all first-order institutions.  
Similar to the first-order institutions, the number of users within the 
system has an impact on the degree of organisation, too (Ostrom et al. 1999; 
Anderies et al. 2004). It affects the type and number of participant users as 
well as the timing and frequency of participation. If the users constitute a 
small group, each actor can act both as a user and a provider. However, 
within a large group, it would be necessary to form multiple organisations or 
to assign different tasks to different users. 
If some users cannot be actively involved in the rule-making process, 
information channels and feedback mechanisms should be established and 
effectively used for ensuring healthy communication. Informing all the users 
about the decisions and employing feedback mechanisms increase the 
transparency of the rule-making processes, too. Additionally, the above-
mentioned benefits from public participation, namely learning, ownership 
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and compliance, are correlated with, among others, the effectiveness of com-
munication.  
 
Table 7.4  Questions for studying the second-order institutions of 
 participation 
 
Questions Possible answers 
What are the possible reasons to change 
the rule? 
 Request from the users/providers 
 Frequent non-compliance 
 Redundancy 
 Social/economic/ecological/technological change 
Which users are permitted to participate 
in changing the rule or crafting a new 
rule? 
 All users 
 Elected users  
 WUO members 
 Land - owner users 
What is the proportion of users that are 
involved in changing the rule? 
 From 0% to 100% 
What is the proportion of the rule 
revisions that involve the users? 
 From 0% to 100% 
What is/are the phase/s of the rule-
changing process that users participate 
in? 
 Identifying the need to change the rules 
 Defining alternative revisions for the rules 
 Crafting the revised rule 
 Giving feedback on the revised rule 
When are the non-participant users 
informed about the revisions made? 
 Right after the decision is made 
 After a time lag 
How are the non-participant users 
informed about the revisions made? 
 Written announcements 
 Verbal announcements 
 Upon individual request 
 Through ad hoc/regular meetings 
How are the opinions and inquiries of 
non-participant users taken and 
responded to? 
 In writing 
 Verbally  
 Through ad hoc/regular meetings 
 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this chapter, an institutional approach is proposed in order to evaluate the 
participatory mechanisms incorporated into the rules of CPR management. 
Based on the premises of institutional approaches to collective action, it is 
proposed that public participation in the rule-making processes about CPR 
management can contribute to collective action towards resource sustaina-
bility. For investigating the relevance of the proposition, a conceptual frame-
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work depicting CPR management is developed and applied by elaborating 
on the interaction of actors with other elements through the institutions of 
collective action and by formulating questions that facilitate the assessment 
of the institutions of participation under three nested categories. 
For a given socio-ecological system, studying the institutions at three 
levels has two major implications in terms of participation. On the one hand, 
the zero-order institutions exist in all systems, whether or not participatory 
mechanisms are in place. On the other, the existence of participatory rules in 
first and second levels is an indication of the users’ degree of organisation, 
which is manifested directly by the second-order institutions. The questions 
formulated for the first- and second-order institutions facilitate assessing the 
degree of organisation at each level. The answers to the questions about 
first-order institutions will show the extent to which the users participate in 
the processes for definition and enforcement of rules about regulation and 
monitoring of resource use and infrastructure maintenance. If the users are 
organised in order to change the rules about regulation and monitoring, they 
would have second-order institutions in use. It can be expected that the more 
the users are organised, the more they participate in the rule-making pro-
cesses and in turn the more effective the rules become. 
The coherence and completeness of the proposed framework and the cate-
gories of institutions can be improved and tested by developing an evalu-
ation tool with criteria and indicators for each level and applying the tool in 
a real-life setting. Interaction of participation rules with social, ecological 
and economic factors can also be incorporated into the evaluation tool. In 
order to reflect on possible interactions, indicators can be defined and 
monitored for each dimension. For the above example about sanctions, the 
amount of water used, the quantity of monetary fines collected (or accrued) 
and the results of soil quality measurements can be used to evaluate whether 
or not there is a need to change the rules about sanctioning excessive water 
use. Finally, the participation of users during the development and appli-
cation of the tool can create further opportunities for participatory rule-
making.  
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